Comparative Vigilance: a Simple Guide by Allan M Feldman & Ram Singh
Comparative Vigilance: A Simple Guide 
 
Brown University Department of Economics Working Paper No. 2008-11 
 
Allan M. Feldman 
Department of Economics, Brown University 





Department of Economics 
Delhi School of Economics 
University of Delhi 




September 3, 2008 
Abstract 
 
In this paper we discuss a new tort liability rule, which we call super-symmetric comparative 
negligence and vigilance.   When both injurer and victim in an accident are negligent, it 
provides for liability shares that depend on the degrees of negligence of the two parties, similar 
to the standard comparative negligence rule.  Unlike standard liability rules, however, when 
both parties are vigilant (i.e., taking more care than is efficient), the rule provides for liability 
shares that depend on the parties’ degrees of vigilance.  Moreover, when one party is negligent 
and the other is non-negligent, our rule provides for variable liability shares, that respond to 
both carefulness and carelessness of the parties.  Our liability rule is equitable; it has no 
discontinuity at the efficient point where both parties are just meeting their standards of care; 
and it provides incentives that guarantee the injurer and victim will choose the efficient care 
levels.  This paper does not include theorems and proofs; rather it explains the results with the 
aid of a simple example, laid out in an easy 3 x 3 table. 
Keywords:  Comparative vigilance, equity, economic efficiency, tort liability rules, Nash 
equilibrium, social costs, pure comparative vigilance, super-symmetric rule. 
JEL classification: K13, D61. 
  
1  INTRODUCTION 
 
In a typical tort case one party, the injurer, has harmed another party, the victim.  If it is an 
accidental tort (rather than an intentional one), the harm is the result of an accident, a random 
event whose chance of occurring, or probability, depends on the amounts of care taken by one 
or both parties.  The victim’s harm is measured in terms of money damages.  This 
measurement might be easy (how much to repair that car?) or difficult (how much to 
compensate for that death?).  Tort law commonly sets a standard of care, or an amount of care 
to be taken by a party which is legally sufficient:  If a party takes that much care or more she 
has met the standard and is non-negligent, but if she takes less care, she is negligent.  A tort 
liability rule specifies how the money damages should be split between victim and injurer.  A 
negligence-based liability rule splits the damages in a way that generally depends on the 
negligence or non-negligence of the injurer and the victim.  Commonly-used negligence-based 
liability rules include simple negligence (all damages fall on the injurer if she negligent, 
otherwise on the victim), negligence with a defense of contributory negligence (all damages 
fall on the injurer if she is negligent and the victim is non-negligent, otherwise on the victim), 
and negligence with a defense of comparative negligence (all damages fall on the injurer if she 
is negligent and the victim is not, are split between them according to degree of fault if both are 
negligent, and fall on the victim otherwise). 
  All the standard rules share these properties: 
 (A)  When one party is negligent and the other is not, the negligent party bears all the 
accident loss. 
(B)  When both parties are non-negligent, the liability shares do not depend on the 
degrees of “vigilance” shown by the parties, that is, the care levels above and beyond what is 
efficient. 
(C)  When both parties are non-negligent, all the accident loss falls on just one party.
1  
                                                 
1 See the modeling of liability rules in Brown (1973), Diamond (1974), Polinsky (1989), Landes and Posner 
(1987), Shavell (1987), Barnes and Stout (1992), Posner (1992), Levmore (1994), Kaplow (1995), Biggar (1995), 
Miceli (1997), Cooter and Ulen (1997), Feldman and Frost (1998), Jain and Singh (2002), Kim (2004), Kim and 
Feldman (2006), and Singh (2007), among others. 
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In this paper we will describe a new liability rule which drops properties A, B and C.  
This new rule treats victim and injurer symmetrically when both are negligent, as does any rule 
incorporating the doctrine of comparative negligence, which splits damages according to 
degree of fault (or degree of negligence).  But it also treats them symmetrically when both are 
non-negligent, splitting the damages according to their degrees of vigilance.  Moreover, the 
logic of the rule is exactly the same when both parties are negligent and when both parties are 
non-negligent.  For these reasons we call our new rule the super-symmetric comparative 
negligence and vigilance rule, or the super-symmetric rule for short.
2  
There are several reasons why we want to drop these properties.  First consider property 
A.  Consider auto accidents, assume the single care dimension is vehicle speed, and suppose 
the standard of care is set at the speed limit of 50 mph.  Suppose a collision of 2 vehicles 
results in $10,000 in damages to the victim.  Then if the victim is going exactly 50 mph (and 
just meeting the standard of care) and the injurer is going 51 mph (slightly too fast), all 
damages fall on the injurer.  But now suppose the injurer is going 100 mph.  If an accident 
occurs she is treated exactly the same way (paying $10,000 in damages) as she would be if she 
had been going 51 mph.  Of course accidents may be more probable at the higher speed, and 
damages may be greater, all of which the injurer may consider.  But our point is this: if the 
victim is meeting her care standard, the legal treatment of the injurer is the same whether she is 
slightly negligent, or grossly negligent.  Similarly, suppose the injurer is going 51 mph 
(slightly too fast), and the victim is considering whether to drive 50 mph (just meeting the 
standard) or 35 mph (being very careful).  Under property A, the consequences for injurer and 
victim are the same in either scenario.  If the injurer is failing to meet her standard, the legal 
treatment of the two parties is the same whether the victim is just meeting her standard, or 
being exceptionally careful. 
So property A implies that over large ranges of care and/or carelessness, a liability rule is 
entirely unresponsive to changes in care level, neither rewarding additional care nor penalizing 
additional carelessness.  Moreover, although property A makes the liability rule broadly 
unresponsive, it simultaneously makes it too responsive at one critical point.  What we mean is 
apparent from the speeding example:  If the injurer is going 51 mph and the victim is going 50 
mph, all the damages fall on the injurer.  If the injurer slows down very slightly, to 50 mph, 
                                                 
2 See Feldman and Singh (2008) for an extensive mathematical analysis of the super-symmetric rule. 
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and the victim speeds up very slightly, to 51 mph, there is an abrupt shift in liability: suddenly 
all the damages fall on the victim.  Such an abrupt change in liability assignments is a 
mathematical discontinuity, and property A requires a discontinuity at the crucial point where 
victim and injurer are just meeting their standards of care. 
When both injurer and victim are negligent, the traditional rule of negligence with a 
defense of contributory negligence gives the injurer a free pass: all the damages stay with the 
victim.  This creates an obvious inequity.  In terms of the speeding example, if both victim and 
injurer are driving 51 mph in the 50 mph zone, contributory negligence puts all of the damages 
on the victim.  In contrast, the more modern rule of negligence with a defense of comparative 
negligence splits the damages according to degree of fault, or degree of negligence.  For the 
purposes of economic analysis, degree of negligence it is most naturally defined, for the 
injurer, as the injurer’s amount of carelessness divided by the total amounts of carelessness of 
the two parties, with an analogous definition for the victim.  In the speeding example, it would 
be easiest to calculate the degrees of negligence as 1 mph / (1 mph + 1 mph) = ½ for each 
party, and comparative negligence would then split the damages equally.  On the other hand, if 
the speeds were 51 mph for the victim and 59 mph for the injurer, the rule would put 9/10 of 
the damages on the injurer and 1/10 on the victim.  So comparative negligence is appealing for 
its equitable treatment of victim and injurer when both are negligent, each is penalized based 
on the relative degree of her carelessness. 
But property C implies there is no splitting of damages when both parties are non-
negligent, and property B implies that the liability assignment when both are non-negligent 
must be entirely unresponsive to the parties’ degrees of care.  For instance, under the rule of 
negligence with comparative negligence as a defense, whether the injurer is driving at 50 mph 
(just meeting the standard) and the victim is driving at 35 mph (being very careful), or vice 
versa, all damages fall on the victim.  The inequity is clear:  negligence with comparative 
negligence as a defense produces equitable outcomes when both are negligent, but not when 
both are non-negligent.    
  3 
This paper builds on the work of many authors.
3  In particular, Calabresi and Cooper 
(1996), Honoré (1997) and Parisi and Fon (2004) have argued that when parties are either both 
negligent, or both non-negligent, equity considerations suggest sharing of liability - making 
only one party bear all the loss is not justified.  Parisi and Fon use the term “comparative 
diligence” for a concept somewhat similar to our “comparative vigilance.”  Moreover, some 
studies have shown that courts and juries are inclined toward comparative apportionment of 
losses when both parties are negligent and when both are non-negligent.  See Feldman & Singh 
(2008) for further discussion on this point.  Kahan (1989), Grady (1989), Honoré (1997) and 
Singh (2007) have argued that property A, and the discontinuity in liability assignments it 
implies, may not be consistent with the doctrine of “causation.”  On the other hand, some 
papers have focused on the importance of properties A, B, and C for inducing efficiency; see 
for instance  Jain and Singh (2002), Kim (2004), Parisi and Fon (2004), and Singh (2006).  
However, as we shall show below, efficiency can be had without these 3 properties. 
In this paper we discuss a new liability rule, super-symmetric comparative negligence 
and vigilance, that drops properties A, B and C.  When one party is negligent and the other is 
non-negligent, the rule provides for variable liability shares that respond to degrees of 
carefulness or carelessness of the two parties.  When both parties are negligent, the rule 
provides for liability shares that depend on degrees of negligence of the two parties, as per 
comparative negligence, but when both parties are non-negligent the rule also provides for 
variable liability shares that depend on the degrees of vigilance of the two parties.  The rule is 
equitable, the rule has no discontinuity at the point where both parties are just meeting their 
standards of care, and the rule results in the choice of efficient care levels by the two parties. 
This paper is meant to be relatively non-mathematical.  Our rigorous mathematical 
results are laid our elsewhere (Feldman & Singh (2008)).  Here we try to minimize notation, 
and we rely on one simple example to explain the new liability rule as well as other related 
rules.  In section 2 we define most of our terms, lay out our example, and discuss the doctrines 
                                                 
3Calabresi (1965) noted that fault based liability rules ignore the value of deterring faultless accidents.  For 
criticism of the modeling of liability rules on various grounds, including properties B and C, see Grady (1989), 
Kahan (1989), Marks (1994), Burrows (1999) and Wright (2002).   See Marks (1994) and Miceli (1996) for 
commentary on Grady (1989).  For an analysis of the comparative negligence rule see Schwartz, (1978), Landes 
and Posner (1980), Cooter and Ulen (1986), Haddock and Curran (1985), Rubinfeld (1987), and Rea (1987).  For 
a critical review of some of these works see Liao and White (2002), and Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar (2003). 
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of pure comparative negligence and pure comparative vigilance.  In section 3 we use our 
example to analyze our new super-symmetric rule.   In section 4 we summarize and conclude. 
.     
2  THE MODEL, THE TERMINOLOGY,  AND THE EXAMPLE INTRODUCED  
 
We assume there are two people, called X and Y, who are involved in some activity that creates 
a risk of accidents.  An accident is an unintended and unforeseen bad outcome.  If an accident 
occurs, there is one victim, who sustains a money loss  , and one injurer, who sustains no 
loss.  We assume that X is the injurer and Y is the victim.
0 > L
4   
Parties X and Y can spend money to reduce the likelihood of accidents.  If an accident 
occurs, a court will measure each party’s care by looking at the money she has spent (rather 
than by looking at her vehicle speed, as in the example of section 1).  Let x and  y  represent 
the care expenditures of X and Y.  We let   represent the probability of an accident, 
which depends on the care levels of the two people.  The average, or expected, accident loss is 
.  We assume the parties are risk neutral; this means they only consider expected 
losses, and do not consider other statistical properties of risk such as standard deviations. 
) , ( y x p
(,) pxyL
Total social cost (TSC) is defined as the sum of care-taking costs of both parties and 
expected accident costs.  That is,  (,) TSC x y p x y L = ++ .  We let   represent the 
combination of care levels which minimizes total social cost.  We assume this care combination 
is unique.  Efficiency means minimizing total social cost, and so we call   the efficient 
care combination. 
) , (
* * y x
) , (
* * y x
If an accident occurs, the victim takes the injurer to court.  Victim, injurer and court are 
all assumed to have full information about care levels, the accident probability function, the 
loss L, and the expected loss.  All know 
* x  and 
* y .  The court sets a standard of care for each 
of the parties.  If a party’s care level falls below that standard, she is negligent; if the care level 
is greater than or equal to the standard, she is non-negligent.  If she takes more care than the 
standard, she is vigilant.  We make the standard assumption that, for each party, the court sets 
                                                 
4 See Kim (2003) and Kim and Feldman (2006) for discussions of negligence-based rules when there is 
uncertainty about who will be the victim and who will be the injurer. 
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the standard of care at the efficiency level.
5  That is, party X is negligent if  , and she is 
non-negligent if  
* x x <
* x x ≥ .  She is vigilant if 
* x x > .  Similar terminology holds for party Y.   
  Negligence-based liability rules are usually defined by specifying how they operate in 4 
different domains:  Domain 1, where both parties are non-negligent; domain 2, where party X 
is negligent and party Y is non-negligent; domain 3, where both parties are negligent; and 
domain 4, where party Y is negligent and party X is non-negligent.  The figure below shows the 
4 domains in a typical model where the variables x and   are allowed to be any number 
greater than or equal to zero.  (Cross-hatching indicates which domains include which 
boundary lines.) 
y
  x 
   y 
  Domain 4 
  Y  negligent
      Domain 1 
Both non-negligent 
  Domain 2 
  X  negligent




     
We will use the following convenient notation:  For any x and any  y , let 
* x xx Δ =−  
and 
* y yy Δ= − .  Note that  x Δ   (or  y Δ ) can be positive, zero, or negative, depending on 
whether X (or Y) is vigilant, is at the efficient care level, or is negligent, respectively.  If   x Δ  is 
positive, it represents party X’s excess care.  If negative, it represents her shortfall in care, or 
her carelessness. 
When both parties are negligent, the defense of comparative negligence places accident 
losses on each party according to that party’s degree of fault.  As we see it, the most natural 
                                                 
5 See Feldman & Kim (2005) for some discussion of this basic assumption. 
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measure of  party X’s relative degree of fault, or degree of negligence, is her shortfall in care 





 .  (Note that each of the Δ 






 .  Under what is called a pure comparative negligence liability rule, 
losses are allocated to the two parties according to these weights, which sum to 1, when both 
are negligent. 
Now suppose both parties are non-negligent, and suppose at least one is strictly non-
negligent, or vigilant.  Imagine you are trying to construct a liability rule for splitting the 
accident loss, a rule which parallels the pure comparative negligence rule, but which works 
when both parties are non-negligent.  It is easy to measure party X’s excess care; this is again 
* x xx Δ= − , and party Y’s is 
* y yy Δ =−.  Both of these numbers are now non-negative, since 
we are assuming both parties are non-negligent, and at least one is positive, since we are 
assuming at least one party is vigilant.  Therefore we can easily measure party X’s relative 





, and similarly for Y’s 
degree of vigilance.  The denominator of the fraction cannot be zero because we have assumed 
at least one is vigilant, and the sum of the two degree of vigilance factors is 1. 
Under pure comparative negligence, the larger a party’s degree of negligence, the larger 
is the fraction of the loss the court puts on her.  Obviously we don’t want to have a party’s 
larger degree of vigilance to result in a larger fraction of the loss on that party.  We want the 
opposite.  The straightforward way to do this is to allocate losses, when both are non-negligent 
and at least one is vigilant, by setting party Y’s fraction of the loss equal to party X’s degree of 
vigilance, and vice versa.  (That is, X’s degree of vigilance becomes Y’s share, and vice versa.)  
We will call a liability rule that does this in the both parties non-negligent domain a pure 
comparative vigilance rule.
6
                                                 
6 The reader may question the wisdom of a rule that rewards care in excess of the efficient level.  But care, 
whether at a less-than-efficient or greater-than-efficient level, is always a “good” rather than a “bad,” since it 
reduces accident probabilities and expected losses.  It is beneficial to the person making the expenditure, and it is 
also beneficial to the other person.  Our view is that if it makes sense to reward additional care in domain 3, as 
comparative negligence does, then it makes sense to reward additional care in the other domains as well.   
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We can now turn to our simple example.  In this example, each party can spend 0, 1, or 2 
on care (in dollars or other currency units).  That is, we have 3 discrete care levels that can be 
used by X and Y.  Each pair of care levels (,) x y  produces some accident probability   
and some expected loss   .  In the tables below we suppress the probability function 
and only show the expected losses.  The example will be presented in a series of almost-self-
explanatory tables.  Table 1 simply shows expected losses contingent on the care levels.  Table 
2 shows total social cost in each cell, found by adding together the expected loss and the sum 
of the corresponding care amounts.  It is clear from table 2 that the efficient pair of care levels 
is  .  Whatever legal rule may be used, the goal is to induce the two parties to get 
to the efficient combination of care levels.  Table 3 shows the 4 domains: domain 1, where 
both are non-negligent, domains 2 and 4, where one is negligent and the other is non-negligent, 
and domain 3, where both parties are negligent.   
(,) pxy
(,) pxyL
** (,)( 1 , 1 ) xy=
Table 1  Expected Losses
        
  Y's Care:      
 2  6  4.5  4 
 1  7  5  4.5 
 0  10  7  6 
       
  X's Care:  0 1  2 
 
Table 2  Total Social Costs
        
  Y's Care:      
 2  8  7.5  8 
 1  8  7  7.5 
 0  10  8  8 
       
  X's Care:  0 1  2 
       
  Note that the efficient point is (1,1). 
 
Table 3  Domains & Total Social Costs     
              
  Y's Care:         Green  Domain 1 - both non-negligent. 
 2  8  7.5  8   Gold Domain  2  –  X negligent 
 1  8  7  7.5   Red  Domain 3 –both negligent 
 0  10  8  8   Orange Domain  4  -  Y negligent 
            
  X's Care:  0 1  2       
  8 
 
In the next table we show the amounts of excess care (or, if negative, excess carelessness) 
for parties X  and Y.  That is, table 4 shows the pairs (,) x y Δ Δ .  We get these numbers in the 
obvious way, remembering that the correct amounts of care are 1 and 1.   Table 5 shows the 
degrees of negligence and vigilance of the two parties in domain 1 (both-non-negligent) and 
domain 3 (both negligent), and is derived from table 4.  (Recall the degrees of either 










 for party Y.  Also note that, when 
both are non-negligent, the formula is only computed when at least one is vigilant.)  In order to 
make table 5 (and many of our subsequent tables) more transparent, we won’t show pairs or 
vectors in the cells of a single table; instead we will show the numbers for X in a table on the 
left, and the numbers for Y on the right. 
Table 4  Excess of (or Shortfall in) Care
                    (,) x y Δ Δ  
  Y's Care:      
 2  (-1,1)  (0,1)  (1,1) 
 1  (-1,0)  (0,0)  (1,0) 
 0  (-1,-1)  (0,-1)  (1,-1) 
      
  X's Care:  0 1  2 
Table 5  Degrees of Negligence & Vigilance
              
  Y's Care:       Y's Care:     
  2  0  0.5    2  1  0.5 
  1    1    1    0 
  0 0.5        0 0.5     
           
  X's Care:  0 1 2    X's Care:  0 1 2 
   Degrees for X     Degrees  for  Y 
At this point we can use our tables to analyze liability rules.  As a preliminary, we will 
consider negligence with a defense of pure contributory negligence.  It places all losses on the 
victim Y if she is negligent and the injurer X is not.  This gives the bottom row, right two cells 
of the table (domain 4).  It also places all losses on Y if both parties are non-negligent.  This 
gives the upper right four cells (domain 1).  It places all losses on the injurer X if she is 
negligent and the victim Y is not.  This gives the left column, upper two 2 cells (domain 2).  
  9 
But if both parties are negligent, as in the lower left cell (domain 3), the losses are split 
according to relative degrees of negligence, which are  (0.  in this easy example.  When 
we apply this allocation of losses, it implies that the expected losses of table 1 above get split 
between the two parties in the fashion shown in table 6 below.  As with table 5, table 6 shows 
numbers for X on the left side and for Y on the right.  In table 7 which follows, we simply add 
each party’s own care expenditures to the table 6 figures.  Therefore table 7 shows, for party X, 
x + the part of expected loss allocated to the injurer by the liability rule, and, for party Y, y + 
the part of expected losses allocated to the victim by the liability rule.  We call these sums the 
total burdens on the respective parties. 
5,0.5)
Examination of table 7 establishes that the efficient combination of care levels 
 is a Nash equilibrium under negligence with a defense of pure comparative 
negligence.  That is, given that X is choosing a care level of 1, it is best for Y to choose a care 
level of 1, in which case her burden (from the right hand table) is 6.  Conversely, given that Y 
is choosing a care level of 1, it is best for X to choose a care level of 1, in which case her 
burden (from the left hand table) is 1.  This table illustrates a well-known result: negligence 
with pure comparative negligence as a defense is efficient, in the sense that it induces the 
parties to settle on the efficient pair of care levels, as a Nash equilibrium. 
** (,)( 1 , 1 ) xy=
Table 6  Expected Losses Placed on the Parties, Negligence With Pure Comparative Negligence
              
  Y's Care:       Y's Care:     
  2 6 0 0    2 0  4.5  4 
  1 7 0 0    1 0 5  5.5 
  0 5 0 0    0 5 7 6 
           
  X's Care:  0 1 2    X's Care:  0 1 2 
   Losses on X     Losses  on  Y 
Table 7  Total Burdens on the Parties, Negligence With Pure Comparative Negligence
              
  Y's Care:       Y's Care:     
  2 6 1 2    2 2  6.5  6 
 1  7  1 2    1 1 6 6.5 
  0 5 1 2    0 5 7 6 
           
  X's Care:  0 1 2    X's Care:  0 1 2 
   Burden on X     Burden  on  Y 
  Note: The pair (x,y) = (1,1) is efficient, and is a unique Nash equilibrium. 
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Next we will use our tables to analyze pure comparative negligence plus vigilance.  In 
particular, consider a liability rule that (a) places all damages on the negligent party when one 
party is negligent and the other is non-negligent (property A), (b) uses pure comparative 
negligence when both parties are negligent, and (c) uses pure comparative vigilance when both 
parties are non-negligent and at least one is vigilant.  We need to also specify the loss 
allocation at the efficient point (1,1).  We will assume: (d) the losses at the efficient point all 
fall on the victim (as with a standard negligence rule, rather than a strict liability rule).  These 
new assumptions require that we go back to table 6 and modify the top right 4 cells (domain 1) 
to reflect assumptions (c) and (d).  When modifying the 3 cells where at least one party is 
vigilant, we use table 5, and we remember that under pure comparative vigilance, X’s degree of 
vigilance becomes Y’s share, and vice versa.  This produces table 8 below.  We then add back 
the care levels of the two parties to get the total burdens on the parties, shown in table 9. 
Table 8  Expected Losses Placed on the Parties, Pure Comparative Negligence plus Vigilance
              
  Y's Care:       Y's Care:     
  2 6  4.5  2    2 0 0 2 
  1 7 0 0    1 0 5  4.5 
  0 5 0 0    0 5 7 6 
           
  X's Care:  0 1 2    X's Care:  0 1 2 
   Losses on X     Losses  on  Y 
 
Table 9  Total Burdens on the Parties, Pure Comparative Negligence plus Vigilance
              
  Y's Care:       Y's Care:     
 2  6  5.5  4    2 2 2 4 
 1  7  1 2    1 1 6 5.5 
  0 5 1 2    0 5 7 6 
           
  X's Care:  0 1 2    X's Care:  0 1 2 
   Burden on X     Burden  on  Y 
  Note: The pair (x,y) = (1,1) is efficient.  However the unique Nash equilibrium is at (2,2). 
 
Table 9 provides important results:  Adding pure comparative vigilance in the 
straightforward way to pure comparative negligence produces a liability rule that does not 
work.  That is, the efficient point may not be a Nash equilibrium, and there may be an 
inefficient combination of care levels that is a Nash equilibrium. 
  11 
 
 
3  THE SUPER-SYMMETRIC RULE 
 
We now describe the super-symmetric comparative negligence and vigilance rule.  It works as 
follows: 
(a) At the efficient point  , the liability rule will assign a specific share of 
losses 
** (,)( 1 , 1 ) xy=
X w  to party X,  and  a specific share  Y w  to party Y.  The law must specify these 
weights in advance; once chosen, they become an integral part of the rule.  The weights 
are non-negative and sum to 1.  If an accident occurs at the efficient care levels, the 
court splits the losses between the two parties according to  X w  and  Y w .  A 
“negligence-style” super-symmetric rule sets (,) ( 0 , 1 ) XY ww= .   (“No liability without 
fault.”)  A “strict-liability-style” super-symmetric rule sets (,) ( 1 , 0 ) XY ww= .  (“If 
victim is non-negligent, injurer pays.”)  A “strictly equitable” super-symmetric rule sets 
( , ) (0.5,0.5) XY ww= .  (“At the efficient point, divide the losses equally.”)   For the 
purposes of our example, we will generally assume (,) ( 0 , 1 XY ww= ) , making most of 
what follows comparable to what we have already done in tables 8 and 9 above.  (At 
the end, however, we will briefly consider the ( , ) (0.5,0.5) XY ww=  super-symmetric 
rule.)  Note that our results do not depend on what  X w  and  Y w  are set at, as long as 
they are set in advance and fixed. 
(b) For any point (,) x y , in any of the domains, if an accident occurs the court must 
calculate several terms involving ratios of probabilities (or, equivalently in our model, 


























.  In domain 3, where both parties are negligent, 
** (,) ( , ) p xy px y >  (i.e., the accident probability is too high), and so the ratio is less 
than 1.  In domain 1, if both parties are non-negligent and at least one is vigilant, then 
  12 
** (,) ( , ) p xy px y <  (i.e., the accident probability is too low) and the ratio is greater than 
1.  In domains 2 and 4, when one party is negligent and the other is non-negligent, this 







− , must be positive in domain 3, when both parties are negligent, 
and it must be negative in domain 1, if at least one party is vigilant. 
(c) Whenever any accident occurs, no matter where (,) x y  may be, the court calculates 














 .  These terms, however, represent just parts 
of their liability shares; they will generally not sum to 1.  Translating to expected 
values, these terms will add 
** (,) X wpx yL  to party X’s burden, and 
** (,) Y wpx y L  to 
party Y’s burden.  Note that these partial burden terms are constant, and do not vary 
with (,) x y . 
(d) When both parties are negligent (domain 3) and an accident occurs, the court will add 
an additional term to the liability share of each party.  Party X’s additional liability 
share will be equal to her relative degree of negligence times the difference term, and 
similarly for party Y.   Remember that the difference term is positive when both parties 





x yp x y
⎛⎞ Δ
− ⎜⎟ Δ+ Δ⎝⎠
; party Y’s 
is similar.  In terms of expected values, these incremental terms add 
** ((,) ( , ))
x





 to party X’s burden, and 
** ((,) ( , ))
y





 to party Y’s burden.  When both parties are negligent, 
both these increments are positive. 
(e) When both parties are non-negligent (domain 1), and at least one is vigilant, the court 
will add precisely the same terms to liability shares and expected values as in the both-
parties-negligent case.  That is, exactly the same formulas will apply.  This works 
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−  is negative when both are non-negligent and 
at least one is vigilant, whereas it is positive when both are negligent. 
(f)  When one party is negligent and the other is not (domains 2 and 4), the court will add a 
positive increment to the liability share of the negligent party, and a negative (or zero) 
increment to the liability share of the non-negligent party.  If particular, in domain 2, 






0 − >  is added to X’s liability share, and 
** (,) (,)
(,) (,)
* p xy p xy
p xy pxy
−  to Y’s.  The shares in domain 4, where Y is negligent and X is not, 
are similarly defined, switching the identities of the negligent and non-negligent 
parties.   These liability share increments give rise to expected loss increments, and 
therefore increments to the parties’ burdens.  In domain 2 the expected loss increments 
are   for X and 
* (,) ( ,) 0 pxyL px yL −>
** * (,) (,) 0 px yL px y L − ≤  for Y.  The expected 
loss increment for X has a nice intuitive interpretation:  It is the extra expected loss 
resulting from X’s negligence (in choosing 
* x x < , instead of 
* x ), given that Y is at a 
non-negligent y.  In domain 4, where Y is negligent and X is not, the expected loss 
increments are similar, 
* (,) (, ) 0 pxyL pxy L − >  for the negligent party Y and 
 for the non-negligent party X.  
** * (, ) ( , ) 0 pxy L px y L −≤
 
Now are ready to apply the super-symmetric liability rule to our simple example.  We 
will focus on expected losses, rather than liability shares, as we have done previously with the 
numerical example.  Recall we are assuming (,) ( 0 , 1 ) XY ww= .  Table 10 below shows the parts 
of the burdens on the two parties that result from (1) their care expenditures x and y, 
respectively, and (2) the constant expected loss terms from (c) above, namely 
** (,) 0 X wpx yL =  for party X and 
** (,) 5 Y wpx y L =  for party Y. 
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Table 10  Partial Burdens on the Parties, Super-Symmetric Rule, Care Costs Plus Constant Term  1 Y w =  
              
  Y's Care:       Y's Care:     
  2 0 1 2    2 7 7 7 
  1 0 1 2    1 6 6 6 
  0 0 1 2    0 5 5 5 
           
  X's Care:  0 1 2    X's Care:  0 1 2 
   Partial Burden on X      Partial Burden on Y 
Table 11 shows relative degrees of vigilance or negligence in domains 1 and 3, taken directly 
from table 5.  Table 12 shows the 
** (,) ( , ) p xyL px y L −  increments, easily derived from table 
1, and table 13 multiples the degrees of vigilance or negligence by the 
** (,) ( , ) p xyL px y L −  
increments. 
Table 11  Degrees of Negligence and Vigilance
              
  Y's Care:       Y's Care:     
  2    0  0.5    2    1  0.5 
  1        1    1        0 
  0  0.5          0  0.5       
           
  X's Care:  0 1 2    X's Care:  0 1 2 
   Degrees for X     Degrees  for  Y 
Table 12  Expected Losses – Efficient Expect. Losses
        
  Y's Care:      
 2  1  -0.5  -1 
 1  2  0  -0.5 
 0  5  2  1 
       
  X's Care:  0 1  2 
Table 13  Increments to Burdens Based on Degrees of Negligence and Vigilance
              
  Y's Care:       Y's Care:     
  2    0  -0.5    2     -0.5  -0.5 
  1        -0.5    1        0 
  0  2.5          0  2.5       
           
  X's Care:  0 1 2    X's Care:  0 1 2 
   Increments for X     Increments  for  Y 
The final calculations are for domains 2 and 4, where one party is negligent and the 
other is non-negligent.  In domain 2, where X is negligent ( 0 x = ) and Y is not ( 1, 2 y = ), the 
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expected loss increments are 
* (,) (,) ( 0 ,) ( 1 ,) p xyL px yL p yL p yL −= −  for X and 
 for Y.  Checking back to table 1, with X negligent we 
have , and we see that the first term is 7 – 5 = 2 at 
** * −
0 x = 1 y
(,) (,) ( 1 ,) 5 px yL px y L p yL −=
= , and 6 – 4.5 = 1.5 at  2 y = .  The 
second term is 5 – 5 = 0 at  1 y = , and 4.5 – 5 = -0.5 at  2 y = .  Since this example is symmetric, 
very similar results apply in domain 4.  All this gives rises to table 14, which shows increments 
to burdens based on the super-symmetric rule when one party is negligent and the other is not.  
Note some interesting properties of table 14, which illustrate important general results for the 
super-symmetric rule:   When one party is negligent and the other is not, the increment to her 
burden is positive for the negligent party, but zero or negative for the non-negligent party.  
Second, these increments vary; and as the non-negligent party increases her vigilance, the 
incremental burdens on both parties fall.  
Table 14  Increments to Burdens, Super-Symmetric, One Party Negligent and One Party Non-Negligent
              
  Y's Care:       Y's Care:     
  2    1.5       2  -0.5    
  1 2         1 0      
  0    0  -0.5    0  2  1.5 
           
  X's Care:  0 1 2    X's Care:  0 1 2 
   Increments for X     Increments  for  Y 
Now we are ready to see how the super-symmetric rule governs the behavior of the 
parties.  We add together table 10 (which shows 
** (,) X x wpx yL +  and so on);  table 13, which 
shows increments to burdens based on comparative negligence and vigilance under the super-
symmetric rule; and table 14, which shows increments to burdens when one party is negligent 
and the other is non-negligent under the super-symmetric rule.  All this gives table 15 below. 
Table 15  Total Burdens on the Parties, Under the Super-Symmetric Rule  1 Y w =  
              
  Y's Care:       Y's Care:     
  2   1.5 1 1.5    2 6.5  6.5  6.5 
 1  2   1  1.5    1  6   6  6 
  0 2.5   1 1.5    0 7.5 7 6.5 
           
  X's Care:  0 1 2    X's Care:  0 1 2 
   Burden on X     Increments  for  Y 
 
Note: The pair (x,y) = (1,1) is efficient.  It is also the unique Nash equilibrium.  In fact, it is a 
dominant-strategy equilibrium! 
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Table 15 illustrates some general results:  Under the super-symmetric comparative 
negligence and vigilance rule, the efficient care levels constitute a Nash equilibrium.  
Moreover, there is no inefficient Nash equilibrium.  That is, the efficient point is the unique 
point where party X is minimizing her own burden, given the care level chosen by party Y, and 
simultaneously, party Y is minimizing her own burden, given the care level chosen by party X.  
Proofs for the general model are in Feldman & Singh (2008).  Note also for this particular 
example that the efficient pair of care levels is actually a dominant-strategy equilibrium:  No 
matter what party Y is doing, it is best for X to choose  1 x = , and similarly for Y.  Finally, note 
the apparent absence of jumps, or discontinuities, in the burden levels.  This also is an 
interesting general result:  The super-symmetric comparative negligence and vigilance rule 
gives continuous burden functions for the two parties.  
Tables 10 and 15 above were based on the assumption that (,) ( 0 , 1 XY ww= ) ; that is, at 
the efficient point, all the accident costs fall on the victim Y.  This is what we earlier called a 
“negligence-style” super-symmetric rule.  We now briefly consider a “strictly equitable” super-
symmetric rule, in which the losses at the efficient point are divided equally: 
( , ) (0.5,0.5) XY ww= .  We will leave it to the reader to produce the analog to table 10.  The total 
burden table, corresponding to table 15 above, is the following: 
 
Table 16  Total Burdens on the Parties, Under the Super-Symmetric Rule  1/2 Y X ww = =  
              
  Y's Care:       Y's Care:     
  2 4  3.5  4    2 4 4 4 
 1  4.5  3.5 4    1 3.5   3.5  3.5 
  0 5    3.5  4    0 5  4.5  4 
           
  X's Care:  0 1 2    X's Care:  0 1 2 
   Burden on X     Increments  for  Y 
 
Note: The pair (x,y) = (1,1) is efficient.  It is also the unique Nash equilibrium.  In fact, it is a 
dominant-strategy equilibrium! 
 
Once again, under the super-symmetric comparative negligence and vigilance rule, the 
efficient pair of care levels constitute a unique Nash equilibrium.    In fact, in the example they 
are a dominant-strategy equilibrium.  And now we have a remarkably equitable distribution of 
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total burdens, quite different from the distribution of total burdens in table 15, because here we 
assumed ( , ) (0.5,0.5) XY ww=  to start. 
 
4  CONCLUSIONS 
 
Various legal scholars have suggested an equitable division of liability between the parties 
when both injurer and victim are non-negligent, similar to the comparative negligence division 
when both are negligent.  We have shown in this paper that such a division will not work if it is 
based on a naïve conjunction of pure comparative negligence and pure comparative vigilance.  
However, if done in a subtle way, comparative vigilance can be combined with comparative 
negligence; in fact they can be combined in a way that makes them perfectly symmetric. 
 For standard liability rules, if one party is negligent and the other is non-negligent, all 
liability falls on the negligent party, no matter how careless the negligent party or how careful 
the non-negligent party.  We think this is a crude property, which our super-symmetric rule 
does not share.  Under the super-symmetric rule, liability shares vary as the two parties vary 
their care levels, even when they remain in domain 2 (X negligent, Y not) or in domain 4 (Y 
negligent, X not).  And when one party is negligent and the other is not, increased carelessness 
by the negligent party is penalized with a higher liability share, and increased care by the non-
negligent party is rewarded with a lower liability share. 
Some scholars have observed that the discontinuous shift in liability shares at the 
efficient point under standard rules is discomforting.  It is obviously not possible to rigorously 
discuss continuity and discontinuity in the context of a discrete example.  However in Feldman 
& Singh (2008) we provide the continuous version of the super-symmetric rule, and continuity 
for the rule in this paper can be appreciated by comparing table 7, showing total burdens on the 
parties under negligence with comparative negligence as a defense, and table 15, showing total 
burdens on the parties under the super-symmetric rule.  The former shows a discontinuity in 
burdens (look at the burdens on X, as she shifts between  0 x =  and  1 x = ), and the latter shows 
no such discontinuity. 
Finally, our super-symmetric rule, which uses exactly the same logic in the both-vigilant 
domain as in the both-negligent domain, which provides for varying liability shares within 
each of the one-party-negligent and other-party-non-negligent domains, and which avoids 
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abrupt jumps in liability shares and burdens, succeeds in providing the proper incentives to the 
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